Freedom and Ethics Begin Where Cause and Effect Ends: Two Proofs.

Freedom and Ethics Begin Where Cause and Effect Ends: Two Proofs

Michael C. Carey

I contend that the historical framing of the free will debate in terms of cause and effect has preemptively loaded the discussion in favor of determinism, because those terms are analytic: the concept of effect is necessarily involved in the concept of cause, and vice versa. By shifting to the language of act and condition — which is synthetic and lacks that strict necessitation — a genuine conceptual space for free action opens that collapses into neither determinism nor randomness.

The aim of these two proofs is not to demonstrate that free action actually occurs, but to show that the concept is internally coherent. Determinism remains coherent on its own terms; the goal here is conceptual parity. Moreover, the new framing rescues free action from familiar confusions such as “uncaused cause” or “self-causation.” Causal language was never adequate to the task.

Once this reframing is in place, the second proof derives an intrinsic, other-regarding normativity directly from the structure of free action itself — not from God, reason, or sentiment. Normativity is not derived from facts but is coincidental with free action, thereby closing the is/ought gap. As a result, determinism and moral relativism are reduced to performative absurdities.

Grounding Act:

Cause–effect: analytic; condition–act: synthetic. The concept effect is necessarily involved in the concept cause and vice versa, but the concept act is not necessarily involved in the concept condition. It is in virtue of this lack of strict necessitation involved in the language of act and condition that they are adequate to the articulation of free activity, as opposed to the language of cause and effect.

Proof of internal coherence of the concept of free action.

1

An act is the determination of one possibility through the exclusion of others.

2

To deny that an act is the determination of one possibility through the exclusion of others is itself a determination of one possibility through the exclusion of others.

3

An indeterminate act would be a determination of neither one possibility nor a determination of another possibility. But if it is not a determination of any possibility, then it is not a determination at all and hence not an act.

4

An underdetermined act would be a determination of not quite one possibility through the exclusion of others, but not quite one is still not a determination of one possibility and hence an underdetermined act is reducible to an indeterminate act.

5

Those acts whose conditions constrain the possible determinations to one are necessary, or unfree. Those acts whose conditions constrain the possible determinations to more than one are contingent, or free. An unfree act is a sufficiently conditioned act. A free act is an insufficiently conditioned act.

6

Buridan’s Ass holds that an ass situated exactly between two identical bales of hay will starve to death if there is no way for it to determine which one is more desirable. Many who deny that an act can be free believe that a human in the same situation (in this case, not hay, but edible food for a human) would be subject to the same fate. Now the human could resolve this issue with a coin toss. He is to toss the coin and choose based on the side that turns up. But does the side that turns up sufficiently determine his choice? Can he not simply toss the coin again? If he can but does not, is it the side of the coin that did the determining—or him? If he can and does so, how can the choice to reflip the coin be determined by the outcome of the toss at all? The choice is an act; the side that turns up is the condition. If he chooses to flip the coin again, this determination would not be sufficiently conditioned by either outcome of the toss, nor could it be indeterminate or underdetermined—rather, it would be determinative in itself. Its determination would occur in its very acting and would not be provided by the conditions of the toss. And if nothing stops him from flipping the coin again, then why must the coin mediate his choice at all? He thus has no need of the coin to sufficiently condition his choice, but can choose despite the insufficiency of the conditions to determine his choice for himself. And if he has no need of the coin, then on what basis would he need anything else to sufficiently condition his choice?

Proof: Normativity derived from the structure of free action, and reduction of determinism and moral relativism to performative absurdities.

1

Those acts whose conditions constrain the possible determinations to one are necessary, or unfree. Those acts whose conditions constrain the possible determinations to more than one are contingent, or free.

2

It is impossible for a free agent, or person, to determine under insufficient conditions their own inability to determine under insufficient conditions. One cannot freely will away one’s own ability to freely will at all.

3

The conditions which make my free activity possible are not exactly the same conditions that make the free activity of another possible. That I am alive is necessary for my free activity, but that he is alive is not necessary for my free activity, though life as such is necessary for us both. Therefore, insofar as the conditions of another are not necessary for the possibility of my own freedom or freedom as such (for my own presupposes that) can I determine the conditions of another’s freedom to be otherwise. And that otherwise may include a condition that prohibits the possibility of their own freedom.

4

Because it is impossible for me to freely determine otherwise the conditions that make my own freedom possible, how can I freely will that another agent determines otherwise those same conditions? For does not freely undermining my own free activity and freely willing another’s undermining of my own free activity amount to the same thing? Now what I cannot to any extent freely will upon myself I can to some extent freely will upon another, but what I cannot freely will upon myself I cannot freely will that another will such upon me, and therefore I… should not will the same upon them.

5

This should is not unwarranted, for it is the direct result of the act of reason in comparing what cannot be done with what can be done, or more generally a comparison of that which is necessary (even if hypothetically) with that which is possible. The should is a judgment. The should is the synthesis of must and may. This judgment (in fact, any judgment) is inseparable from the act of reason which it presupposes, for the judgment is not another free act, but the result of an act of reason. It is the act of reason considered as condition for action. But since we are speaking of insufficiently conditioned acts, the should cannot be sufficient to determine action, for such acts are determinative in themselves. That the ought be derived from the is presupposes that the is is prior to the ought, but on the contrary, every possible free act occurs as permissible or impermissible given the structure of free action as such—independent of any judgment. The ought is neither derived from free action nor added unto it, but is coincidental with it. Free action is intrinsically normative, and there can be no normativity apart from it.

6

For you to will someone’s unfreedom directly is to will that in whatsoever another wills, they will as if your own free action were the sufficient condition of their action—not because your action is good or for any other reason, but simply because it is yours and not theirs. This is the essence of domination, the maxim of the dominator being, “only I shall be free.”

7

That the act of rape is considered so reprehensible is because one cannot will it upon themselves—definitionally—but one can will it upon another. To say that there is no binding normative judgment that results from this recognition is to deny the intrinsic impermissibility of the act. But if it is not intrinsically impermissible then what is stopping one from being able to will it upon oneself? Therefore, either it is impermissible in itself, should not be done, and the reality of free will in the victim is granted—or there is no such thing as rape. If there is no such thing as rape, then go tell that to the victims who claim that there is. Q.E.D.

These two proofs form the core of a larger treatise titled The Geometry of Freedom, which explores the same foundational ideas across metaphysics, physics, and ethics. The full work is available here: